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We present a theoretical model postulating that the relationship between crime and governance is 
“hump-shaped” rather than linearly decreasing. State failure, anarchy and a lack of infrastructure are 
not conducive for the establishment of any business. This includes illegal businesses, as criminals 
need protection and markets to convert loot into consumables. At the bottom end of the spectrum, 
therefore, both legal business and criminal gangs benefit from improved governance, especially 
when  this  is  delivered  informally.  With  significant  improvements  in  formal  governance  criminal 
activities decline. We use data from the International Maritime Bureau to create a new dataset on 
piracy  and  find  strong  and  consistent  support  for  this  non-linear  relationship.  The  occurrence, 
persistence  and  intensity  of  small-scale  maritime  crime  are  well  approximated  by  a  quadratic 
relationship  with  governance  quality.  Organised  crime  benefits  from  corrupt  yet  effective 
bureaucrats, and informally governed areas within countries. 
 
Keywords: Governance, Crime, Piracy, Informal Institutions, Law enforcement,  
JEL Classification: K42, P48 
 
                                                           
*  Capable  research  assistance  was  provided  by  Sebastian  Wolf.  We  gratefully  acknowledge  the  helpful 
comments by Svetlana Andrianova, Carlos Bozzoli, Gerrit Faber, Giacomo de Luca, David Fielding, Anthony 
Garratt, John Hunter, Jochen Mierau and seminar participants at DIW Berlin, Brunel University and the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Any mistakes are our own. 
† German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), Mohrenstrasse 58, 10117 Berlin, Germany. Email: 
odegroot@diw.de  
 Department of Economics and Finance, Brunel University, Uxbridge UB8 3PH, UK. Email: 
Matthew.Rablen@brunel.ac.uk 
‡ Corresponding Author: Department of Economics and Finance, Brunel University, Uxbridge UB8 3PH, UK and 
German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), Mohrenstrasse 58, 10117 Berlin, Germany.  E-mail:  
Anja.Shortland@brunel.ac.uk    2 
1. Introduction 
 
International patterns in piracy present an interesting puzzle. Despite the public perception 
that “anarchy on land means piracy at sea”
1, state failure is not a statistically significant 
predictor of piracy (Coggins, 2010a). In Somalia, a country to which the above argument is 
often applied, piracy does not originate from the anarchic South, but from the relatively 
stable Puntland, and is reduced when violent territorial conflict intensifies (Coggins, 2010b; 
Percy and Shortland, 2010). In fact, between 1997 and 2009 the top five producers of piracy 
were countries with low to intermediate levels of governance, namely Bangladesh, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Nigeria (Figure 1).
2  
This observation contradicts the literature on the economic effects of governance, which 
argues both theoretically (Azuma and Grossman, 2008; Becker, 1968; Friedman et al., 2000; 
Loayza, 1996) and empirically (Afzar and Gurgur, 2005; Fisman and Wei, 2009; Johnson et 
al., 1998) that crime and illicit activity are reduced as governance improves. In this paper we 
therefore re-examine the relationship between crime and governance, both theoretically 
and empirically.  
We  argue  that  there  is  a  hump-shaped  relationship  between  criminal  activities  and 
governance - even criminals need some minimal level of law and order. “Sophisticated” 
criminal activities involving the production or acquisition of goods that cannot be directly 
and immediately consumed – for example piracy and drug production – are not viable at the 
bottom end of the governance spectrum (anarchy). First, criminals need protection from 
other criminals who may attempt to steal their loot or extort their profits (Gambetta, 1993).  
Second, criminals need a basic transport infrastructure and functioning markets to convert 
loot into consumables. During periods of anarchy (for example during civil conflict) the state 
cannot provide the security and law enforcement necessary to support market activity. 
We begin by developing a simple model of the relationship between governance and crime. 
Our  principal  innovation  is  to  distinguish  between  two  different  modes  of  governance: 
formal governance and informal (non-governmental) governance. By contrast, the existing 
theoretical  literature  focuses  solely  on  formal  governance.  In  line  with  the  existing 
literature,  if  informal  governance  is  positive  and  held  constant,  our  model  predicts  a 
negative relationship between formal governance and crime. However, we show that the 
particular interaction between formal and informal modes of governance observed across 
the governance spectrum – informal modes dominate at low levels of governance, while 
formal modes dominate at high levels of governance  – can lead to a breakdown in this 
negative relationship when informal governance is not held constant. Instead, the model 
predicts a hump-shaped relationship between governance and crime.  
                                                           
1 See, for example, Kaplan (2009) “Anarchy on Land Means Piracy at Sea”   
 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/12/opinion/12kaplan.html 
2 International Maritime Board Annual Piracy Reports.   3 
 
We also investigate the relationship between corruption and crime. When corruption is 
allowed to arise endogenously within the model we also predict a hump-shaped relationship 
between government control of corruption and crime. Additionally, the model predicts that 
higher-value crime develops from lower-value forms of crime in a limited set of countries 
where criminals are able to build up “criminal capital” over time. The more sophisticated the 
crime, the more sensitive is its incidence to the ease with which government officials can be 
bribed. 
Our main empirical contribution is to test the predictions of the model using a new dataset 
on global piracy. A unique feature of our dataset – it is reported by ship’s captains rather 
than by national governments – allows us to include in our sample countries for which no 
reliable data are collected by the national government. By contrast, the existing empirical 
literature has relied solely on data from countries for which national statistics exist. We find 
that  the  inclusion  of  countries  at  the  lowest  levels  of  governance  has  important 
ramifications for the relationship between governance and crime: when such countries are 
properly included we find strong evidence that it is hump-shaped. However, once these 
countries are artificially removed from our sample, we recover the negative relationship 
found in the existing governance literature.  
We also show an association between corruption and the more lucrative forms of piracy. As 
predicted theoretically, sophisticated piracy occurs mostly in countries with intermediately 
low  levels  of  governance,  specifically  countries  characterised  by  relatively  effective,  yet 
corruptible bureaucracies and countries where pirates can use informally governed regions 
for refuge. 
Although our findings suggest that crime is decreasing in governance over much of the 
governance spectrum, the finding that the relationship is more globally characterised as 
hump-shaped  has  some  important  policy  implications  for  combating  sophisticated, 
organised  crime.  At  low  levels  of  governance,  aid  targeted  at  improving  (informal) 
governance and infrastructure
3 may be counter-productive, because it may move criminals 
towards their “sweet spot” on the governance spectrum.  
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  In  section  2  we  review  the  literature  on  crime  and 
governance, focusing on the differing roles of formal and informal modes of governance. 
Section 3 builds on this literature to develop a theoretical model. Section 4 sets out our 
empirical  modelling  strategy;  section  5  introduces  a  new  dataset  on  global  patterns  of 
piracy; and section 6 presents the results. Section 7 concludes. 
 
                                                           
3 See, for example, Baker (2010).   4 
2. Governance and Crime 
In this section we review the literature – spanning both economics and sociology – on the 
relationship  between  governance  and  crime.  We  distinguish  between  formal  modes  of 
governance  (provided  by  the  state),  and  other  “informal”  modes  of  governance.  Such 
informal modes of governance include village councils, Islamic courts, traditional tribal caste 
or clan-based structures, social norms, and patron-client relationships, but also organised 
criminal groups (e.g. the Mafia).  
The  term  anarchy  denotes  the  complete  absence  of  governance  -  neither  property  nor 
human rights are protected. All transactions are governed by coercion – the classic “jungle 
economy” (Piccione and Rubinstein 2006). In countries with the lowest levels of governance, 
formal  governance  has  collapsed  or  is  very  weak.  Markets  only  exist  where  they  are 
underpinned by (coercive forms of) informal governance. Where there is a pool of young 
men trained in the use of violence and easy access to weapons, informal governance tends 
to be provided in the form of organised private protection.
4 However, unless these groups 
are  well  entrenched,  they  behave  as  “roving  bandits”  -  maximising  short-term  gains  by 
aggressively  expropriating  surpluses,  thereby  undermining  investment  and  trade  (Olson, 
1993,  p.  568).  Several  sociological  studies  document  how,  where  territory  is  contested, 
protection rackets become unable to provide contract enforcement and physical security at 
an affordable price (Varese, 2001; Volkov, 2002). The absence of stable informal governance 
also  affects  illegal  activity  negatively.  Without  effective  protection  the  anticipation  of 
opportunism, theft or extortion of the proceeds of crime constitutes a strong disincentive to 
“invest” in committing crime in the first place. Second, criminals need the institutions which 
underpin the functioning of markets: the proceeds from crime and illicit activity usually 
need to be traded. Even a mugger needs to sell a stolen watch or mobile phone. 
Countries with intermediate levels of governance are characterised by the co-existence of 
both  formal  and  informal  modes  of  governance.  There  is  evidence  that,  at  these 
intermediate  levels  of  governance,  formal  and  informal  modes  of  government  act  as 
complements (Ananth Pur, 2007; Boesen, 2007; Lazzarini et al., 2004). If there is stability, 
informal governance institutions can uphold law and order locally and support a thriving 
“grey” or “shadow” economy. Organised criminal groups can provide private protection and 
enforcement of property rights, allowing people (including other criminals) to transact and 
enjoy the gains from trade – albeit at a price (Dixit, 2003 and 2004; Gambetta, 1993). It may 
also be possible to purchase private protection by bribing an official, or, as for example in 
the  case  of  1990s  Russia,  employing  the  “extra-departmental”  services  of  the  official 
security forces (Varese, 2001; Volkov, 2002). The combination of stable informal and weak 
or corruptible formal governance is therefore likely to be ideal for criminals needing to trade 
the proceeds from crime. 
                                                           
4 See, for example, Bandiera (2003) on the Sicilian Mafia.   5 
The countries in which we observe the highest levels of governance are characterised by a 
predominance of formal governance over informal. Informal institutions are unsuited to 
delivering the highest levels of governance as they typically apply the law selectively and 
only within their geographical sphere of influence. Informal structures also often provide 
incumbent firms with protection against new entrants (Varese, 2001), which means that 
they are economically less efficient than state-provided “rule of law for all” (Dixit, 2004). 
Consistent  with  these  arguments,  the  economic  literature  finds  beneficial  effects  of 
improvements in the quality of formal governance on legal economic activity (Grossman and 
Kim, 1995; Kaufmann, 2004).  
Crime and opportunities for bribing officials fall as illicit activities are discouraged by the 
effective operation of the police and the courts. Empirical studies that exclude countries 
with  the  lowest  levels  of  development  find  that  increasing  levels  of  governance  are 
associated with falling levels of crimes such as smuggling (Berger and Nitsch, 2008; Fisman 
and Wei, 2009) and theft (Afzar and Gurgur, 2005). 
In  summary,  the  literature  we  review  points  to  a  hump-shaped  relationship  between 
governance and sophisticated forms of crime. 
 
3. Theoretical Model 
A  country  is  characterised  by  a  level  of  governance,    1 , 0  g ,  where  0  g   denotes  a 
perfectly anarchic state, and  1  g  denotes a state with perfect governance. We think of 
these two end values as theoretical extremes, between which lie all states that we observe 
empirically  in  the  world.  The  previous  section  documented  a  three-fold  relationship 
between formal and informal governance: dominance of informal governance at the lowest 
governance levels, complementarity and co-existence of modes at intermediate levels of 
governance,  and  dominance  of  formal  governance  at  high  levels  of  governance. We 
formalise  this  relationship  in  the  following  way.  Total  governance,  g,  comprises  both  a 
formal ( f ) and an informal (i) component, and we assume that the relative share of formal 
versus informal governance varies as a function of the total level of governance: 
                                                                                g i g f g                                                             (1) 
For  0  g , it follows from (1) that      0 0 0  i f . Based on the evidence presented in section 
2, we assume that in a perfectly governed state all governance is formal (   1 1  f ), which, 
from (1), implies    0 1  i . To capture the idea that informal governance dominates at the 
lowest levels of governance we assume that the first increment of governance above   0  g   
is  purely  informal  governance,    0 0  g f   (so    1 0  g i ).  Last  we  assume  that  formal 
governance  is  an  increasing  and  convex  function  of  total  governance  ( 0  g f ,  0  gg f ),   6 
which implies  0  gg i . For instance, a simple specification of the model that satisfies these 
assumptions is given by setting   
2 g g f   and      g g g i   1 . Note that this specification 
implies that formal and informal governance are complementary at low and intermediate 
levels of total governance, but act as substitutes at higher levels of total governance. 
Individuals within the country have an initial wealth, w, and can choose to steal loot with a 
value of  0  x . The cost of planning and executing the criminal act required to attain x is 
given by    k x /  , where    x   is a cost function satisfying  0  x  ,    0 0  x  , and  0  xx  . The 
parameter  k  denotes an individual's level of “criminal capital”, by which we refer to an 
individual's know-how in stealing loot. Having stolen x, a criminal nevertheless faces further 
hurdles before x can be safely consumed. First, a criminal may be detained by the police 
authorities; second, a criminal must trade the loot for consumable goods. 
The probability that a criminal is detained by the police authorities is    1 , 0  d . We suppose 
this  probability  is  a  function  of  the  strength  of  formal  governance.  We  therefore  write 
    g f d d  , where    0 0  d ,    1 1  d  and  0  f d . 
If a criminal evades the authorities the implied transaction cost incurred in trading loot for 
consumables depends on the extent to which there is a functioning market mechanism, a 
prerequisite for which is the enforcement of a minimum level of property rights, and the 
provision  of  a  minimum  level  of  infrastructure  to  get  goods  to  market.  While  both 
infrastructural development and the enforcement of property rights are associated with 
formal governance, informal methods of governance can also enable criminals to enforce 
their property rights in addition to any protection offered through formal governance. We 
therefore assume that the share of x that is lost in trading the loot for consumables is a 
(decreasing) function of total governance,      1 , 0  g m , where    1 0  m ,    0 1  m  and  0  g m . 
The criminal is therefore able to consume a proportion      g m  1  of the loot. 
The potential for corruption of the authorities arises endogenously within the model. If a 
criminal is detained by the police, the criminal can offer a bribe  0  b . We assume that the 
probability  of  the  bribe  being  accepted  depends  on  the  ability  of  the  state  to  control 
corruption – which we suppose to be an increasing function of formal governance (     g f c ) 
– and on the size of the bribe. We can then write the probability that a bribe b is accepted as 
      g f c b a , , where  0  b a  and  0  c a . 
We assume    a  further satisfies the following conditions. First, for all      1 , 0 , 1 0  f f  with 
1 0 f f  ,      1 , f c b a  stochastically dominates      0 , f c b a , so a given bribe is more likely to be 
accepted in a state with lower formal governance. Second,      0 1 , , 0   b a c a , so a zero bribe 
is  always  rejected,  and  a  bribe  of  any  size  is  always  rejected  in  a  state  with  perfect 
governance. Last, in order to ensure the existence of an optimum,  0  bb a . For example, a   7 
simple  specification  that  satisfies  these  properties  is  given  by       
b f c f c b a  1 ,   and 
    f e f c
  
1 . 
If the authorities reject the bribe, the loot is confiscated by the authorities, and the criminal 
is punished (fined) in proportion to the size of the loot, at a rate  0  p . If the authorities 
accept the bribe, the criminal escapes punishment, and the authorities agree to assist the 
criminal in trading the loot for consumables. We suppose that the extent to which police 
assistance  improves  the  enforcement  of  a  criminal's  property  rights  is  related  to  the 
capability of the authorities to enforce property rights more generally, as measured by the 
level of formal governance    g f . Therefore, having successfully bribed the police, a criminal 
is able to consume a proportion          g m g f   1 1  of the loot. 
The  resulting  structure  of  the  model  is  illustrated  in  Figure  2,  where  the  payoffs 
  N R A Z Z Z , ,   are given by 
         
 


















   
  







Along the lines of Becker (1968), individuals choose   x b,  to maximise their expected utility, 
given by 
                                                  N A R Z U f d Z U c b a Z U c b a f d EU      1 , , 1 .                  (2) 
For simplicity, we assume individuals are risk neutral, so (2) becomes 
                 
         
. 1 1
1 1 , , 1
k
x
x g m f d
b x g m f c b a px c b a f d w EU

   
       
 
The marginal benefit from an increase in x is given by 
                                             , 1 1 1 1 , , 1 g m f d g m f c b a c b a p f d g B           
so the first order conditions for   x b,  are therefore 






                                                                                                   (3) 
                                            . 0 , 1 1 , :       c b a b g m f p x c b a f d b b                        (4) 
These, together with the boundary conditions    0 ,  x b , implicitly define the equilibrium   8 
level of crime and bribes as functions of governance        g x g b , . It is straightforward to 
verify that the associated Hessian matrix is negative definite, so (3) and (4) are sufficient for 
an interior maximum. 
We can now state the following proposition: 
Proposition 1. At a stable equilibrium, the following hold: 
i)    ; 0 0  x  
ii)    ; 0 0  g x  
iii) For all k there exists a value      1 , 0  k g  such that    0  g x for all      1 , k g g ; 
iv)  If  crime  is  hump-shaped  in  total  governance,  then  it  is  also  hump-shaped  in  formal 
governance (f) and corruption control (c).   
v) Experienced (high-k) criminals commit higher value crime (   0  g xk ), offer larger bribes (
  0  g bk ), and have more bribes accepted (   0  b k a g b ). 
Part (i) of the Proposition establishes that there is no sophisticated crime under anarchy (
0  g ).
5  Although there is no probability of  being detained by the police, criminals are 
unable to consume the loot, because of the absence of a functioning market. Part (ii) 
establishes that, initially, crime is an increasing function of governance. The intuition is that 
the first increment of governance is purely informal governance, which acts to improve the 
conditions required for the operation of criminal markets, while leaving the probability of 
detention unchanged. Part (iii) establishes that crime returns to a zero level for a sufficiently 
high level of governance. In conjunction with (ii), this implies that, at some level of 
governance, crime must begin to fall as a function of governance.  
Together, these results predict a hump-shaped relationship between total governance and 
crime. Our hypothesis is therefore that there is a “sweet spot” for criminal activity on the 
governance spectrum. It occurs where the combination of formal and informal governance 
is strong enough to sustain a reasonable infrastructure and prevent violent conflict between 
rival (criminal) groups over resources and territory. Governance is mainly informal and the 
state ineffective in reigning-in illicit activity. 
Part  (iv)  of  the  Proposition  is  a  simple  corollary  of  parts  (i)  –  (iii).  It  follows  from  the 
observation that, as crime is hump-shaped in total governance, any increasing function of 
total governance (of which formal governance and corruption control are two) will also have 
a hump-shaped relationship with crime.  
Last, part (v) of the Proposition summarises the role of criminal capital. Experienced (high-k) 
                                                           
5 Under anarchy people will commit crimes from which they gain direct utility with impunity.   9 
criminals incur less cost to steal a given value of loot, and will therefore optimally steal 
more. Although ours is a static model, in practice criminal capital is accumulates over time 
with successful criminal operations. The equilibrium level of crime at both extremes of the 
governance spectrum is low, thereby limiting capital accumulation. However, at the sweet 
spot  the  high  equilibrium  rate  of  crime  offers  the  opportunity  for  a  more  rapid 
accumulation. Empirically, therefore, we should expect to see an escalation in the value and 
sophistication of criminal activity over time in countries at the sweet spot. 
Part  (v)  also  shows  that  experienced  criminals  account  for  a  disproportionate  share  of 
successful  corruption,  as  they  offer  the  highest  bribes,  which,  in  turn,  have  a  higher 
probability  of  being  accepted.  High-value  crime  –  the  type  performed  by  experienced 
criminals – should therefore be especially sensitive to the ease with which  government 
officials can be bribed. Empirically, therefore, in countries near the sweet spot – where we 
expect to  observe high-value  crime –  we  should  see  a  decreasing  relationship between 
government control of corruption and the incidence of high-value crime.  
 
4. Empirical Modelling  
Piracy  is  an  ideal  case  study  of  the  relationship  between  sophisticated  crime  and 
governance. Sörenson (2008) points out that boarding and hijacking a ship does not present 
a  real  problem  to  a  determined  criminal  with  basic  firepower  or  good  knife-skills,  as 
merchant ships are traditionally not armed. The real challenge is to remain in control of the 
ship for a sufficiently long time to extract a profit through extortion or sale of the cargo and 
(at  best)  hull.  Profitable  piracy  therefore  requires  access  to  secure  refuges  and  an 
infrastructure for unloading cargo and providing the ship with a new identity - as well as 
markets for the loot.  
In  this  section  we  describe  how  we  can  quantitatively  test  the  propositions  derived  in 
section 3 using a new dataset on the incidence of maritime piracy. Figure 3 illustrates the 
hypothesised relationship between piracy and governance. As the quality of governance 
improves  the  intensity  of  piracy  initially  increases.  Other  things  equal,  better  governed 
territories attract more shipping traffic and increase opportunities for piracy. Infrastructure 
and markets improve and pirates worry less about their profits being contested by rival 
gangs.
6 At the sweet spot lucrative  forms of piracy (such as hijack and ransom)  become 
feasible and occur alongside minor theft, according to individuals’ criminal capital.  
                                                           
6 In a single country study, Percy and Shortland (2010) show that piracy in Somalia was significantly reduced in 
times of instability, uncertainty and violent conflict. Within Somalia most pirate incidents appear to be 
emanating from Puntland: an area of the country in which there is informal governance and some degree of 
stability rather than the anarchy of Southern and Central Somalia (Coggins, 2010b). This suggests that the 
effects of governance on piracy are indeed non-linear: conditions of complete anarchy are bad for pirates.   10 
Beyond the sweet spot, other forms of economic activity become increasingly attractive and 
there is a natural attrition out of piracy and into other forms of business. Additionally the 
state begins to assert control over its territorial waters and port facilities – not least because 
it has increasing interest in safeguarding its imports and exports – causing more pirates to 
go straight (or to prison). A highly effective government will see only occasional incidents of 
petty forms of piracy. For the empirical modelling we therefore split the dependent variable 
into petty maritime crime and lucrative forms of piracy. 
 
4.1. Empirical Modelling 
4.1.1. Logit Model of Presence / Absence of Piracy 
First, we examine the probability of pirate activity being reported from a location. For this 
we construct a dummy variable that indicates whether or not a particular form of piracy 
takes place in a country during a particular year. To examine the drivers of piracy we use 
logit model of the form: 











where  it piracy  is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if an act of piracy takes place in 
country i during year t and 
0 it it i t it Xw           , 
where  it X  is the set of proxies for governance quality and our controls for motive and 
opportunities;  i   and  t w  are zero-mean random effects associated with group and time 
features; and  it   is the residual error term. A unique aspect of our empirical approach is that 
we  allow  measures  of  governance  to  enter  in  a  non-linear  way  by  the  inclusion  of  a 
quadratic term. The implicit null hypothesis of the existing literature is that the co-efficient 
on the governance term is negative, and the co-efficient on the quadratic term is zero. On 
the basis of our model, we hypothesize that this null can be rejected against the alternative 
hypothesis that the co-efficient on the linear term is positive, and the co-efficient on the 
quadratic term is negative (in which case piracy is hump-shaped in governance). 
We  use  random  effects  in  our  estimation  because  of  the  characteristics  of  the  data.  In 
several countries piracy is endemic, while no piracy is reported for others at all. Employing 
fixed  effects  reduces  the  sample  by  about  two-thirds,  with  most  of  the  interesting 
observations dropping out. Additionally, fixed effects are unlikely to be informative because 
the levels of governance within countries do not change much over the thirteen-year period   11 
of  data.  For  instance,  government  effectiveness  changed  by  more  than  one  standard 
deviation in only 8 countries between 1996 and 2008.
7  
4.1.2 Sample Selection  
We suspect that the non-linear interactions between governance and piracy  only become 
evident when countries at the bottom end of the governance spectrum are included in the 
sample. However, countries at the very bottom of the governance spectrum have been  
systematically excluded from existing studies of governance and crime. State failure results 
in the complete breakdown of data collection.
8 Even when a state has some data collection 
capacity, there may be severe concerns about data quality: Soares (2004)  and Azfar and 
Gurgur (2005) show that the willingness to report crime is negatively correlated with 
institutional quality and corruption. As we cannot restore missing observations to previous 
studies, we instead re-run some of the piracy models excluding  the very badly governed 
countries. We show that, beyond a certain cut-off, the hump-shaped relationship breaks 
down and the established result of the governance literature is convincingly resurrected. 
4.1.3. Intensity of Piracy 
Although we have some reservations about whether all acts of piracy accurately reported 
(as discussed below) we also investigate the factors determining the intensity of piracy.  As 
for  the  probability  of  piracy,  our  model  predicts  a  hump -shaped  relationship  with 
governance.   
Although the intensity variables are counts of different types of incidents occurring each 
year, they do not follow the traditional distribution associated with count data, e.g. the 
Poisson distribution or a variant thereof (Figure 1). First, the dataset is dominated by zero 
observations – i.e. no acts of piracy are reported for about half of the countries, and many 
more only see piracy occasionally.  Second, when the conditions are very favourable for 
carrying out acts of maritime crime, a large number of acts are reported. To avoid the few 
locations with large observations dominating the results and to take into account the zero 
observations, we use a log transform of the intensity variable log(1 + piracyit) and perform a 
panel  Tobit  regression.  This  assumes  that  there  is  a  linear  relationship  between  the 
independent variables in Xit and an unobserved (latent) variable 

it y .  We only observe 

it y  if 
it is positive, otherwise we observe a zero:  
  
if     


















                                                           
7 Government Effectiveness worsened in Cote d’Ivoire, North Korea, the Comoros, Mauritania and Eritrea. It 
improved in St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Malta and Dominica. 
8 For example the IMF’s assessment of Somalia (IMF, 2009, p. 3) simply stated that the Somali government 
“has not been able to restore order” and that the “absence of an internationally recognized government and 
official information about economic and financial developments precludes a full assessment…”.    12 
    
where 
*
0 it it i t it y X w          . We are only able to find stable coefficients for small-
scale maritime crime.
9 In what follows we report the results for two samples: the complete 
sample (i.e. all countries with coastlines, where non-zero observations make up about 20% 
of total observations) and a sample of all countries in which at least one act of piracy was 
reported during the period (here non-zero observations make up just under 40% of the total 
observations). 
 
4.1.4. Persistence of Piracy 
Our model also makes predictions about the pattern of piracy over time. The countries in 
which piracy can persist (and intensify) are predicted to be those which function relatively 
well,  but  have  corruptible  bureaucrats.  Where  governance  is  highly  effective  we  would 
expect piracy to be tackled quickly, while in anarchic states opportunities for piracy arise 
infrequently and the booty could be contested or difficult to sell, lowering the gains from 
piracy. We therefore estimate a series of dynamic models with a lagged dependent variable, 




5.1. Piracy dataset 
We construct a new dataset from the Annual Piracy Report compiled by the IMB. Incidents 
of piracy are directly (and voluntarily) reported by the victims to the IMB. Concise narratives 
of each incident including the position, mode of attack, its success or failure and the extent 
of the damage caused are posted on a website and published in the IMB’s annual report. 
This ensures that ship-owners and captains are aware of current piracy hotspots and can 
increase vigilance, adjust routes or arrange insurance accordingly. The dataset therefore 
provides a unique opportunity to study the prevalence of a particular type of crime all 
across the world, regardless of the quality of each country’s police and statistical services. 
We use annual observations of all 148 countries with a coastline observed for the years 
1997-2008.
10  
                                                           
9 Sophisticated piracy is extremely rare and the results are therefore dominated by Somalia and Indonesia. 
10 We exclude countries exclusively bordering the Black Sea and Caspian Sea as piracy is rare there and cannot 
be attributed to a particular country with certainty.    13 
The IMB defines piracy as any “armed maritime crime”, which includes attacks on ships at 
anchor and against steaming ships in territorial waters.
11 We use the narratives to extract 
the following information. First, we create  an annual dummy for whether or not piracy is 
reported for a country as well as an an nual count of the number of incidents in each 
country.
12  Second, we code  “successful”  attacks  according  to  their  severity  into  petty 
maritime crime and sophisticated forms of piracy.
13 We code as “petty crime” any theft 
from boats in quantities that can be carried by a small number of people – most of these 
attacks are on boats at anchor. Sophisticated forms of piracy are hostage-taking, large-scale 
thefts, hijacking for ransom and the disappearance of entire ships with their cargo. These 
forms of piracy require a greater level of organisation and criminal capital – but also access 
to  markets  and  an  infrastructure  or  at  least  protection  for  the  pirates’  hostages  while 
negotiations take place. Last, we split attacks in which pirates failed to board their target 
into “attempted” attacks on stationary ships (likely to be attempted petty theft) and attacks 
on steaming ships (requiring greater sophistication).  
The IMB’s data on piracy are not perfect and we take this into account in our statistical 
models.  For  instance,  there  may  be  under-reporting:  not  every  incident  is  necessarily 
reported to the IMB. Shipping companies sometimes prefer not to report a pirate attack, 
because  it  is  thought  to  reflect  badly  on  them  (Murphy,  2007).  Additionally,  reporting 
incidents of successful boarding can lead to lengthy forensic investigations confining ships to 
harbour (Chalk, 2009). Last, ship-owners may not want to alert insurance companies to an 
emerging piracy hotspot (which could justify a hike in insurance cost) and instead cover 
minor expenses arising from pirate attacks themselves.
14 However, we assume that if piracy 
regularly occurs in a country, at least one captain will report it.  For this reason we use the 
dummy variable for whether or not piracy occurs in a country in our main models instead of 
the intensity of piracy variable. However, in piracy hotspots we risk the opposite problem: 
over-reporting. Attack figures can be exaggerated by captains reporting "suspicious vessels" 
which may well be innocently fishing or  trading. We therefore de-emphasise the weight of 
piracy hotspots by taking logarithms of the intensity measures. 
5.2. Measures of Governance Quality 
The exogenous variable of interest is the quality of governance. For this, we primarily use 
the Kaufmann  et al. (2009) dataset on governance. The “rule of law” index captures the 
                                                           
11 This is a more inclusive definition than that provided by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea in Article 101, which, for instance, restricts piracy to violent acts that occur on the high seas, or outside the 
jurisdiction of any state (http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part7.htm).   
12 We exclude all piracy events where the nationality of the pirates is not clear. This occurs mostly in the South 
China Sea, where acts of piracy are reported for all the littoral states in addition to a number of non-
attributable attacks on the "high seas". Excluding the high seas events therefore only affects the intensity of 
piracy measure. 
13 The IMB considers attacks “successful” if the pirates board the ship. We consider attacks successful if the 
pirates derive at least some profit from the operation. We count as unsuccessful those attacks where pirates 
were chased off a ship without loot. 
14 (http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-07-03-nigeria-privacy_N.htm)   14 
phenomenon we seek to cover most closely.
15 However, the measure is partially based on 
country expert’s opinions of the pervasiveness of crime and the occurrence of piracy could 
influence expert opinions on the overall quality of law. For this reason we use corruption 
control (analogous to the variable c in our theoretical model) and government effectiveness 
as our main proxies for institutional quality and use rule of law only as a robustness check.
16   
Kaufmann et al. (2009) report estimates for these variables for each country from 1996 to 
2008,
17 and Kaufmann (2004) shows that it is feasible to treat these estimates as panel data. 
Although the Kaufmann Index largely fails to capture many informal aspects of governance, 
this does not affect the nature of our empirical test: our model predicts that crime is hump-
shaped in both formal and total governance. 
There  are,  as  yet,  no   comprehensive  global  indices  of  informal  governance.  We  do, 
however,  have  two  variables  that  provide  further  indicative  information  about  the 
conditions within countries that might influence the ability of criminals to establish modes 
of informal governance. The first of these is the occurrence and intensity of conflict. This 
may indicate that the governance score reported by Kaufmann is not uniformly applicable 
across the country, because some regions are not governed by the central authority.  To 
capture  conflict intensity, we use   the MEPV dataset (Marshall and Cole, 20 09), which 
reports on political violence in all countries in the world. This database is particularly useful 
for our purpose, because it reports the magnitude of societal impact of civil or   ethnic 
violence in each year varying from 1 (sporadic political violence) to 10 (extermination and 
annihilation).
18  We look at the effect of different levels of conflict; the idea being that 
intense contest over territory is not helpful for pirates, while abdicated governance and low 
level conflict may well aid piracy.
19  
The other variable – drug production – builds on the idea that (sophisticated) piracy might 
flourish in countries where we observe other types of organised crime:  corrupt officials and 
protection rackets, which are helpful to the drug trade, could also be used by pirates. For 
this we use the annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (1997 to 2010) of the 
                                                           
15 Rule of Law – measuring the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, 
and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence. 
16Control of Corruption – measuring the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including 
both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
Government Effectiveness – measuring the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies 
17 For the years 1997 and 1999, Kaufmann et al. unfortunately do not report any data. In order to be able to 
use these years nonetheless, we chose to interpolate the missing years from the reported data. Knowing that 
the quality of governance does not change very quickly and recognizing that we are mostly interested in major 
differences in the quality of governance, we believe this is safe. 
18 Within the time period that we are looking at, the maximum level of conflict intensity is 7. 
19 Both because abdicated governance can result in pirate havens and conflict means easy access to weapons.   15 
Bureau  for  International  Narcotics  and  Law  Enforcement  Affairs.  Each  year  the  report 
identifies a list of countries that significantly contribute to the production or distribution of 
non-synthetic prohibited drugs. We create a dummy variable of whether or not a country is 
included on this list in a specific year.
20   
5.3 Control variables 
In order to test our hypotheses regarding governance and piracy, we control for other 
possible determinants of piracy suggested by the existing  – largely qualitative – literature 
(e.g. Murphy, 2007 and 2010; Sörenson, 2008). The first common theme in these analyses is 
“opportunity”, such as a favourable geography, busy harbours and / or proximity to trade 
routes.  Second,  would-be  pirates  need  access  to  the  “means”  of  piracy,  such  as  boats, 
capable sea-men, weapons and men trained in their use (“maritime tradition”). Third, the 
emergence of piracy might be aided by a “motive” such as poverty or economic crises. 
Fourth, the ability and willingness of a government to intervene to stop piracy is deemed a 
crucial factor in determining the emergence and the amount of piracy in a location. State 
failure is argued to be positively associated with piracy – a view also commonly expressed in 
the popular press.  
To capture opportunity (and maritime tradition) we first use the number of deep ports per 
country, defined as ports large enough for ships that adhere to the New Panamax standard 
(World Sea Ports, 2010).
21 Second, we include a dummy for countries that border one of the 
following choke points: the Suez Canal and Bab-el-Mandeb, the Panama Canal, the Malacca 
Straits, the Strait of Hormuz and the Bosphorus (Rodrigue, 2004).
22 Each of these passages 
can only be circumvented at great economic cost, whereas otherwise it is possible to  avoid 
the coastline of piracy-prone states. Moreover, busy, narrow shipping lanes cause ships to 
slow down, making them easier to board. The presence of a choke point therefore improves 
conditions for piracy.
23  
                                                           
20 We only include countries producing non-synthetic drugs. We also considered the possibility of using the 
presence or size of counternarcotics aid provided by the US government as an indicator for drug production, 
but, as counter-narcotics aid is used as a political tool, there is a very strong correlation between distance from 
the US and the likelihood of receiving such aid. For the other drugs variable, this correlation is much less 
strong. 
21 Benítez (2009) defines the New Panamax standard as a draft of maximum 15.2 meters (the size of ship which 
will be able to use the Panama Canal after its expansion is completed in 2014). 
22 Somalia is judged to benefit from the Bab-el-Mandeb choke point despite not technically bordering it, as 
Somali pirates operate in the Red Sea as well as the Gulf of Aden.   
23 We were unable to access data on the intensity of shipping traffic on the vario us trade routes. A dummy 
variable indicating whether a country is an oil exporter, which would generate shipping traffic regardless of 
governance issues, was not significant in any regressions specification and is omitted from the reported 
results.    16 
To capture the effect of poverty as a motive for piracy we use the indicator of poverty which 
is most widely available regardless of the level of governance (GDP per capita).
24  
To specifically test for the role of state failure, over and above our other measures of 
governance, we also include a dummy indicating whether a country  in a particular year is 
considered to suffer from state failure. We define state failure using the Polity IV dataset 
(Marshall  et  al.,  2010),  which  gives  an  error  value  of  -77  for  country-years  where  the 
situation is so chaotic that it is impossible to judge institutional quality. If our measures of 
governance are valid, we would not expect to find any additional relationship between state 
failure and piracy.  
We  are  also  concerned  about  possible  reporting  bias:  relations  with  the  IMB  reporting 
centre might be particularly good in Asia as the IMB data are collected in Kuala Lumpur. We 
therefore include a variable measuring the distance between each country’s capital city and 
Kuala Lumpur to control for this potential bias.
25 
Table 1 contains a summary of t he descriptive statistics of all our  variables and Table 2 
summarizes their sources. 
 
6. Results  
6.1. Small-scale Maritime Crime 
6.1.1. Logit Model  
Table 3 reports the results for small-scale maritime crime.
26 The three dependent variables 
are dummies  that indicate whether the following types of attack occurred at least once 
during the year: 1) successful small-scale theft, 2) successful and unsuccessful small -scale 
theft and  3)  all attacks  on  stationary  ships, regardless of  whether or  not they  were 
successful. We observe a hump-shaped effect in governance quality: the governance term 
has a positive coefficient and the quadratic governance term has a negative coefficient, 
significant at the 5% level in all model specifications. It does not matter which proxy we use 
for the quality of governance: qualitatively, the same result is obtained for rule of law, 
corruption control and government effectiveness.   In addition, we currently employ an 
                                                           
24 As GDP per capita is highly correlated with quality of governance indicators, multicollinearity may occur. 
Where we found GDP per capita to be significant, we report the results both with and without this variable to 
show that the statistical relationship for the governance variables is not spurious. 
25 This control is only significant in one model. Therefore it is otherwise excluded from the reported results. 
26 All reported results are calculated in Stata 11. Slight differences in the estimation results occur depending on 
the version of Stata used, the starting estimates and number of quadrature points used by the program.  Using 
the “quadchk” routine we find that there may be relative differences in the estimated coefficients of up to 1%. 
To make the reported results replicable we set the quadrature points to 24 in all specifications. Our main result 
on the relationship between governance and piracy is robust to the version of Stata and the number of 
quadrature points used.   17 
assumption that α = 2 in governance
α. We test the validity of that assumption by varying α 
between 1.5 and 2.5. The results (not reported) do not change significantly. 
In addition we have two further governance-related variables which increase the probability 
of maritime crime: 1) the existence of low-level civil conflict, which undermines the quality 
of governance at least locally and raises the availability of weapons in a country, and 2) an 
acknowledged problem with drug production and distribution, which means that (armed) 
criminal  gangs  are  already  organised  in  the  country.  However,  the  drug  dummy  is  not 
robustly significant across regression specifications.  
As hypothesised, the state failure dummy is not significant in any regression specification. 
The finding is consistent with the earlier study of Coggins (2010a), which found almost no 
support for state failure as a driver of piracy. 
As for the control variables, the small-scale piracy dummy appears to be linked to poverty, 
in that the log(GDP per capita) variable is highly significant (in addition to the governance 
variables).  Foreign  ships  are  a  tempting  target  in  poor  countries.  The  final  factor  of 
relevance is the opportunity arising from ships berthed in harbours. Interestingly here we 
have another quadratic effect: deep sea ports create opportunities, but countries with a 
strong maritime tradition (and hence several deep sea ports) appear to invest in effective 
deterrents against piracy.
27 The optimal arrangement for pirates probably occurs if all of a 
country’s shipping traffic is concentrated in a few congested ports with busy anchorages.  
6.1.2. Sample Selection 
We now test how our result relates to the previous literature on governance and crime, by 
artificially raising the governance threshold at which countries enter our sample. Table 4 
replicates model 3a. The significance of the coefficient in the quadratic relationship initially 
improves when we exclude observations from the very bottom of the governance spectrum. 
This is because we are discarding an obvious outlier - Somalia - which produces persistent 
and intense piracy despite its low governance score. However, the governance score for 
Somalia as a whole is based on anarchic conditions in Southern and Central Somalia: the 
governance  score  of  the  pirate  province,  Puntland,  would  be  considerably  higher  if 
measured separately. 
When increasing the cut-off for inclusion to -0.7, we retain the previous result (column 4a in 
Table  4).  But  once  we  increase  the  government  effectiveness  threshold  to  exclude  all 
countries  below  -0.6  (model  4b  in  table  4),  we  see  that  the  hump-shaped  relationship 
breaks down - the quadratic term is no longer significant.
28 Instead the previous result of a 
negative, linear relationship is once again highly significant   (column 4c).  We therefore 
conclude that the effects of governance obtained from empirical estimations in the medium 
                                                           
27 When we control for GDP per capita this effect disappears, however. 
28 Table 8 lists the countries with government effectiveness scores below -0.7 that are therefore excluded from 
this analysis.   18 
to high governance range seem not to hold for countries at the bottom of the governance 
spectrum. 
 
6.2. Intensity of Piracy 
Table 5 summarises the results on the intensity of (small-scale) maritime crime. We get a 
robust result that at the bottom end of the governance spectrum criminals actually benefit 
from improvements in security, stability and public services and reduced corruptibility of 
government officials. As governance improves further, the incidence of theft from ships 
begin  to  fall.  This  main  result  does  not  depend  on  the  sample  or  the  definition  of 
governance (we see very little difference between the three proxies in models a, b and c). 
Once again we confirm the importance of opportunity (major ports give easy access to 
targets) and poverty as a motive for small-scale theft from ships (the number of incidents is 
reduced  as  GDP  per  capita  increases).  The  intensity  regressions  therefore  confirm  the 
results from the probability regressions.  
 
6.3. Dynamics of Piracy 
Table 6 includes a lagged dependent variable in both the small-scale and large-scale piracy 
logit  regressions  to  investigate  the  persistence  of  piracy.  In  model  8a  we  see  that  the 
persistence of small-scale piracy depends on the institutional quality in the country. The 
interaction terms between lagged small-scale piracy and the governance variables are highly 
significant. Persistence becomes more likely with increasing governance initially and then 
decreases with better governance – i.e. we see occasional opportunistic piracy in high and 
very  low  governance  countries  and  regular  piracy  in  the  middle.  The  raw  governance 
variables are no longer significant in this model (8b). 
 
6.4. Sophisticated Piracy 
For the more lucrative forms of piracy we look at the different types of attacks separately. 
The results are presented in Tables 7 and 8. The most ambitious type of piracy is the theft of 
entire ships and / or major amounts of cargo. This is the turning point on the curve pictured 
in Figure 3, and while the quadratic effect in governance is preserved in the coefficients, it is 
(as  would  be  expected)  no  longer  significant.  Instead  we  observe  a  very  interesting 
interaction between two aspects of quality of governance (models 9 and 10). Major theft 
increases in government effectiveness, which measures (among other things) the quality of 
public goods provision. This would include infrastructure, such as the port and dock facilities 
pirates need to unload the cargo and give a ship a new identity. On the other hand there is a 
strong negative effect on major theft as the government increases its control of corruption.    19 
Last,  the  existence  of  petty  forms  of  maritime  crime  increases  the  likelihood  of  more 
ambitious forms of piracy occurring. This provides evidence for part (v) of Proposition 1 
(high-k criminals take advantage of favourable conditions to steal more) and fits in well with 
explanations of Somali piracy which focus on Somali fishermen initially beginning stealing 
from  ships,  and  eventually  moving  on  to  extortion  and  large-scale  hijack  and  ransom 
(Jasparro, 2009; Tharoor, 2009).
29  
Among the control variables we find evidence for the importance of choke points and major 
ports in generating opportunities for pirates. The log of GDP per capita (as an indicator of a 
poverty motive) is not significant alongside the governance variables (which mai ntain 
significance in specifications which include GDP per capita). Our interpretation of this is that 
sophisticated piracy is organised crime and not driven by extreme poverty.  
Model 11b in Table 8 shows that similar results for the effects of governance are obtained 
for the hostage taking form of piracy: both corruption and a reasonable level of government 
effectiveness are helpful for this form of piracy. Pirates need stability to keep their hostages 
safe from other groups while negotiating ransoms  – if this security can be provided by 
corrupt government officials so much the better. However, model 11a indicates that this 
result is not completely robust: when we control for possible reporting bias the government 
effectiveness  variable  loses  significance  and  distance  from  Kuala  Lumpur  takes  on 
significance instead. Therefore this governance result should be interpreted with caution. 
However, the low-level ethnic conflict dummy is robustly significant; indicating that pirates 
take advantage of areas where government control is compromised. Busy anchorages also 
provide opportunities for hostage taking. As for major theft, there is again no evidence for a 
poverty motive from the GDP per capita variable for hostage taking.  
The main governance variable determining the probability of hijacking of ships and their 
ransom without theft of cargo is low-level conflict. This indicates the importance of the 
existence of ungoverned territories for anchoring ships while ransoms are being negotiated. 
While  there  appear  to  be  benefits  from  corruption  in  specifications  (12  and  13),  these 
disappear if we control both for Somalia as a special case and for the existence of petty 
forms of piracy which are in themselves linked to institutional weakness (model 14). 11 of 
the 45 positive observations of this variable are generated by Somalia and the Somalia 
dummy is highly significant. As for major theft, we again have evidence that sophisticated 
piracy develops from petty forms of piracy when the conditions are right. Again there are no 
GDP per capita effects indicating that sophisticated pirates are not the opportunistic poor 
but relatively well resourced. 
 
6.5. Summary and Interpretation 
                                                           
29 Table 7 reports the result for the contemporaneous petty piracy variable. Very similar results are obtained 
when using the same variable lagged by one period.   20 
The  results  show  a  clear  hump-shaped  relationship  between  governance  and  the 
probability, intensity and persistence of (maritime) crime. In addition we have evidence that 
when parts of a country are governed by criminal or insurgent / dissident groups we may 
well see them developing a piracy branch to increase the profitability of their operations. 
The Kaufmann governance indicators, which provide a broad picture of institutional quality 
at  the  national  level,  may  not  capture  these  pockets  of  lawlessness  within  countries 
adequately.  
Looking at the coefficients, the models predict that the best conditions for petty maritime 
criminals  exist  in  countries  where  the  government  effectiveness  score  is  in  the  region 
between  -0.9  and  -0.5  and  the  corruption  score  between  -1.3  and  -0.9.  Countries  like 
Bangladesh,  Cambodia and  Cameroon  are  exactly  in  this  range,  while countries  such  as 
Liberia,  Haiti,  and  Sierra  Leone  are  “too  dysfunctional”  for  a  thriving  piracy  business. 
Institution-building measures in Indonesia are reflected in the considerable improvements 
in Indonesia’s governance scores, moving pirates from being right in the sweet spot up until 
2003 to well beyond it by 2008. 
 
7. Conclusions 
We have provided both a theoretical model and empirical evidence showing a hump-shaped 
effect of governance on criminal activity. Criminals and especially organised crime benefit 
from improvements in market and state structures at the bottom end of the governance 
spectrum.  The  model  and  results  are  intuitive and  accord  with  sociological  research  on 
organised criminal groups.  
Because the piracy dataset is based on victim reports to the IMB rather than being collected 
by governments via local police authorities, it allows us to study crime in countries which 
are too dysfunctional to provide sufficient data to be included in previous empirical studies 
of  the  economics  of  crime.  Specifically,  we  are  able  to  show  that  piracy  benefits  from 
improvements in governance at the lower end of the governance spectrum, as opportunities 
for theft and enjoying the fruits of crime improve. In weakly governed countries piracy can 
become endemic, while in ungoverned, failed states and well governed countries piracy 
occurs  only  very  occasionally.  Informally  governed  territories  within  countries  can 
additionally provide safe havens for criminal activity. 
For sophisticated piracy (and by extension other forms of lucrative organised crime) we 
show that optimal conditions arise when corrupt elites or bureaucracies are able to provide 
selective  access  to  excellent  physical  infrastructures  and  thriving  markets  in  return  for 
bribes. Given that the various aspects of institutional quality tend to be highly correlated, 
such conditions arise only rarely: for example when a sudden deterioration in economic   21 
performance or political stability undermines discipline and commitment in the civil service, 
as was demonstrated in Indonesia after the Asian crisis. 
We cannot be sure that our results on the effect of governance on maritime crime can be 
generalised  to  other  forms  of  crime.  However,  the  current  problems  of  rich  European 
countries with organised criminal gangs from Eastern Europe and Asia suggests that well 
developed  markets  and  infrastructures  are  more  attractive  to  these  criminals  than  the 
conditions in their poor and unstable home countries. Organised criminal groups, such as 
the Italian Mafia, thrive in environments where government effectiveness and corruption 
exist alongside one another: precisely the conditions our models suggest are perfect for 
sophisticated piracy, too. What our result does show clearly, is that the established result of 
a negative, linear relationship obtained by analysing (mostly or exclusively) reasonably well 
governed countries does not necessarily apply to countries at the bottom of the governance 
spectrum. Criminality might increase as markets create new opportunities and can become 
endemic  unless  bureaucrats  are  incentivised  to  tackle  rather  than  tolerate  or  protect 
criminal  organisations.  This  insight  needs  to  be  factored  into  policy  advice  to  countries 
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Proof of Proposition 1 
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(iii)  Setting  1  g   in  (3)  we  have  that    0 1    p B ,  so  0  x EU .  Therefore,  since    0 0  g x , 
continuity guarantees that for each  k  there exists a value      1 , 0  k g  such that      0  k g B . It 
follows  that  at    k g g    we  have        0
0   k
x k g B
 ,  so      0  k g x   is  an  equilibrium.  For 
    1 , k g g  we have    0  g B  so the first order condition (3) does not hold, and the equilibrium is a 
corner solution at    0  g x . 
(v) Totally differentiating using (3) and (4) gives 
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x , which implies that the denominators of (A.2) 
and (A.3) are negative. Since the numerators of (A.2) and (A.3) are positive we therefore have 
    . ; 0 0   g b g x k k  25 
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Figure 1: Distribution of intensity of (all acts of) piracy  
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Figure 2. Decision tree of a prospective criminal 
 
 
Figure 3. Hypothesised Relationship between Piracy and Governance 
Minor Theft 























d[ f ]  1 – d[ f ] 
ZR  ZA 
ZN  1 – a[b,c]  a[b,c] 
Detained  Not Detained 
Accepted  Rejected   27 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of all variables used 
 
Variable  Control type  N  Mean  St.Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Dummy  variables             
Successful minor theft    1976  0.177  0.381  0  1 
Successful boarding    1976  0.199  0.400  0  1 
Minor theft + attacks on stationary ships    1976  0.209  0.406  0  1 
Large vessel and major cargo theft    1976  0.020  0.141  0  1 
Any vessel and major cargo theft    1976  0.031  0.173  0  1 
Hostage-taking    1976  0.008  0.087  0  1 
Hijack and Ransom    1976  0.023  0.149  0  1 
Intensity variables             
Successful boarding    1976  1.282  6.334  0  124 
Minor theft + Attack on stationary ships    1976  1.469  7.251  0  140 
Explanatory variables             
Log(gdp per capita)  motive  1787  8.920  1.144  5.733  11.388 
State failure  means  1976  0.016  0.126  0  1 
Civil (2)  means  1972  0.010  0.100  0  1 
Low conflict  means + motive  1976  0.081  0.273  0  1 
Deep ports  opportunity  1976  1.822  3.477  0  28 
Choke  opportunity  1976  0.085  0.279  0  1 
Drug exports  means  1976  0.124  0.330  0  1 
Corruption (WB cce+4)  opportunity/means  1728  4.022  1.000  1.984  6.625 
Government effectiveness (WB gee+4)  means  1756  4.023  0.996  1.489  6.531 
Rule of Law (WB rol+4)  opportunity/means  1742  3.988  0.987  1.314  6.116 
Log(Kuala Lumpur)  report bias  1963  9.053  0.659  5.759  9.861   28 
Table 2. Data Definitions and Sources 
Variable  Source  Definition 
Dummy  variables     
Successful minor theft  International Maritime Bureau Annual Report  Actual theft of small amount of goods, defined (approximately) as the amount the 
pirate(s) are able to carry by themselves 
Successful boarding  International Maritime Bureau Annual Report  Actual and attempted theft of small amount of goods 
Minor theft & attacks on stationary 
ships 
International Maritime Bureau Annual Report  Actual and attempted theft of small amount of goods + attacks on ships that are 
stationary (berthed or anchored) 
Large vessel and major cargo theft  International Maritime Bureau Annual Report  Theft of large ships (trawler or greater) + theft of large amount of goods 
Any vessel and major cargo theft  International Maritime Bureau Annual Report  Theft of large ships + theft of small ships + theft of large amount of goods 
Hostage-taking  International Maritime Bureau Annual Report  Piracy cases where individuals are held for ransom, but the ship is not 
Hijack and Ransom  International Maritime Bureau Annual Report  Piracy cases where both ship and crew are held for ransom 
Intensity variables     
Successful Boarding  International Maritime Bureau Annual Report  Actual and attempted theft of small amount of goods 
Minor theft & attacks on stationary 
ships 
International Maritime Bureau Annual Report  Actual and attempted theft of small amount of goods + attacks on ships that are 
stationary (berthed or anchored) 
Controls     
Log(gdp per capita)  Penn World Tables  Log of GDP per capita (in 2006$) 
State failure  Polity IV Project  Dummy variable that takes value 1 if Polity IV reports -77 
Civil (2)  Major Episodes of Political Violence  Country-years where a civil conflict of intensity 2 takes place 
Low conflict  Major Episodes of Political Violence  Low level civil or ethnic conflict dummy: 
 0< MEPV score<4 
Deep ports  World Shipping Register  Number of ports with a draft equal to the New Panamax standard (15.2 meters) 
Choke  Kaluza et al. (2010) and Rodrigue (2004)  Choke points for tanker and container traffic 
Drug exports  International Narcotics Control Strategy  Dummy for countries mentioned as significant non-synthetic drug producers 
Corruption (WB cce+4)  Kaufmann et al. (2009)  Extent to which power is exercised for private gain 
Government effectiveness (WB gee+4)  Kaufmann et al. (2009)  Quality of civil service 
Rule of Law (WB rol+4)  Kaufmann et al. (2009)  Subjective estimate regarding the quality of the Rule of Law 
Log(Kuala Lumpur)  self-collected   Log of the distance between a country’s capital and Kuala Lumpur   29 
Table 3. Small-scale maritime crime: Logit regressions 
Model  1a  1b  1c  2a  2b  2c  3a  3b  3c 
Dependent:  Successful minor theft  Successful boarding  Minor theft & attacks on stationary ships 
Constant  -6.914*  0.070  -0.171  -6.376**     2.025     0.506  -6.494**     2.062     0.453 
  (3.602)  (4.188)       (3.672)  (2.822)  (3.577)       (3.577)  (2.834)      (3.598)       (3.602) 
Corruption Control  3.126*  3.223*                  
  (1.869)  (1.906)                     
(Corruption Control)
2  -0.602**  -0.541**                   
  (0.243)  (0.247)                   
Govt effectiveness        2.855*    2.917**        2.972**     3.114**     
        (1.467)       (1.487)         (1.475)       (1.502)        
(Govt Effectiveness)
 2        -0.549***      -0.460**       -0.567***     -0.483**      
        (0.193)     (0.194)        (0.195)      (0.196)       
Rule of Law      3.328**      3.025*      3.316** 
      (1.638)      (1.593)      (1.606) 
(Rule of Law)
 2      -0.582***      -0.572***      -0.609*** 
      (0.222)      (0.216)      (0.218) 
Log(GDP per capita)    -0.975***     -0.924***    -1.168***     -0.841***    -1.215***    -0.895*** 
    (0.319)      (0.330)    (0.335)      (0.320)    (0.336)      (0.321) 
Civil Conflict (2)  2.302**  2.108**     2.170**  3.181**     2.780**     2.771**  3.126**     2.726**     2.733** 
  (1.079)  (1.041)       (1.040)  (1.406)       (1.294)       (1.268)  (1.406)       (1.293)       (1.272) 
Drug exports  1.057*  0.952     0.947  0.867     0.728     0.734  1.242**    1.070*     1.040* 
  (0.566)  (0.599)       (0.594)  (0.606)       (0.630)       (0.599)  (0.620)       (0.641)       (0.613) 
Deep Ports  0.757***  0.961***     0.961***  0.790***     1.005***     0.919***  0.799***     1.041***     0.960*** 
  (0.227)  (0.309)       (0.310)  (0.259)       (0.311)       (0.290)  (0.272)       (0.316)       (0.306) 
(Deep Ports)
 2  -0.031*  -0.044     -0.043  -0.035     -0.049*     -0.039  -0.036     -0.053*     -0.042 
  (0.019)  (0.029)      (0.028)  (0.023)      (0.029)      (0.026)  (0.024)      (0.029)      (0.279) 
Log-likelihood  -469.672  -458.891  -458.802  -509.542  -495.069                      -488.583  -517.462                      -499.992  -493.424 
N  1728  1694  1708  1756  1722  1708  1756  1722  1708   30 
Table 4. Sample Selection Example: logit regressions 
  4a  4b  4c 
Dependent variable  Minor theft & attacks on stationary ships 
Sample  Excluding government effectiveness score <-0.7  Excluding government effectiveness score <-0.6 
Constant  -20.238**  -7.510  4.252** 
  (9.918)  (10.120)  (1.835) 
Govt effectiveness  8.909**  3.332  -2.071*** 
  (4.539)  (4.595)  (0.449) 
(Govt Effectiveness)
 2  -1.207**  -0.606   
  (0.517)  (0.516)   
Civil Conflict (2)  25.909  22.011  23.083 
  (4169.424)  (1189.676)  (2539.158) 
Drugs  1.280*  1.835**  1.874** 
  (0.700)  (0.748)  (0.737) 
Deep Ports  0.857***  0.863***  0.881*** 
  (0.298)  (0.331)  (0.326) 
(Deep Ports)
 2  -0.038  -0.041  -0.047 
  (0.025)  (0.030)  (0.030) 
Log-likelihood  -343.859  -326.022  -326.761 
N  1355  1277  1277 
 
Countries missing at least partly from both restricted samples: Albania, Angola, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Cameroon, Comoros, Congo, Dem. Rep., 
Congo, Rep. Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Fiji, Gabon, The Gambia, , Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, 
Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Islamic Rep., Iraq, Kenya, Korea, Dem. Rep., Liberia, Liberia, Libya, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palau, 
Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Togo, Ukraine, Vanuatu, 
Venezuela, Yemen. 
Additional countries missing from second sample: Algeria, Bulgaria, Georgia, Guatemala, Kiribati, Lebanon, Madagascar, Micronesia, Peru, Romania, Tonga, Vietnam.   31 
Table 5. Regression results for the intensity of piracy: xttobit regressions 
  5a  5b  5c  6a  6b  6c  7a  7b  7c 
  Countries with at least one act of piracy  All countries 
Dependent:  Successful boarding  Minor theft & attacks on stationary ships  Successful boarding  Minor theft & attacks on 
stationary ships 
Constant  -1.305  -1.155  -0.987  -1.812  -1.142  -1.006  0.259  0.438  -0.002 
  (1.910)  (1.745)  (1.713)  (1.901)  (1.735)  (1.701)  (2.071)  (1.892)  (1.849) 
Corruption Control  1.951**      2.303***      1.753**     
  (0.864)      (0.863)      (0.892)     
(Corruption Control)
2  -0.319***      -0.369***      -0.307***     
  (0.115)      (0.115)      (0.118)     
Govt effectiveness    1.972***      2.040***      1.850**   
    (0.745)      (0.743)      (0.768)   
(Govt Effectiveness)
 2    -0.290***      -0.302***      -0.287***   
    (0.099)      (0.099)      (0.102)   
Rule of Law      1.892**      1.987***      1.931** 
      (0.759)      (0.755)      (0.790) 
Rule of Law-Sq      -0.308***      -0.324***      -0.347*** 
      (0.105)      (0.105)      (0.109) 
Deep Ports  0.200***  0.180***  0.193***  0.208***  0.184***  0.197***  0.190***  0.182***  0.200*** 
  (0.054)  (0.055)  (0.054)  (0.054)  (0.055)  (0.054)  (0.048)  (0.049)  (0..048) 
Log(GDP per capita)  -0.241*  -0.307**  -0.269*  -0.244*  -0.310**  -0.274*  -0.465***  -0.558***  -0.439*** 
  (0.140)  (0.153)  (0.146)  (0.138)  (0.152)  (0.144)  (0.155)  (0.166)  (0.158) 
Civil Conflict (2)                0.585*  0.559* 
                (0.338)  (0.339) 
Log-likelihood  -808.371  -812.911  -810.461  -835.736  -841.681  -839.064  -858.097  -894.744  -887.925 
N  966  972  970  966  972  970  1694  1722  1708 
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Table 6. Piracy Dynamics: logit regressions 
  8a  8b 
Dependent:  Successful boarding 
Constant  8.124***  5.829 
  (2.151)  (3.491) 
Lag s/a minor theft  -9.888***  -10.340*** 
  (2.965)  (3.100) 
Govt effectiveness    -0.196 
    (1.564) 
(Govt effectiveness)
2    -0.085 
    (0.196) 
Interaction laggedminor* effectiveness  5.393***  5.547*** 
  (1.606)  (1.672) 
Interaction laggedminor * (effectiveness)
2  -0.644***  -0.648*** 
  (0.215)  (0.222) 
Deep Ports  0.221***  0.249*** 
  (0.078)  (0.078) 
Drug dummy  1.772***  1.676*** 
  (0.607)  (0.586) 
Civil conflict (level2)  2.586*  2.503* 
  (1.498)  (1.466) 
Log(GDP per capita)  -1.339***  -0.832*** 
  (0.257)  (0.312) 
Log-likelihood  -453.461  -450.530 
N  1583  1583 
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Table 7. Top end Piracy: Logit regressions 
Model  9  10 
Dependent:  Large vessel and major cargo theft  Any vessel and major cargo theft 
Constant  -1.396      -3.012***    
  (1.119)      (1.025)     
Corruption Control  -2.441***     -1.937***   
  (0.766)      (0.652)     
Govt effectiveness  1.307**   1.348**    
  (0.635)       (0.603)      
Choke Point  1.792***    2.079***    
  (0.431)       (0.470)      
Deep Ports  0.126**     0.113**    
  (0.050)       (0.051)      
Petty Piracy  1.722***     1.492***    
  (0.448)       (0.425)      
Log-likelihood  -132.041  -178.668 
N  1728  1728 
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Table 8. Hostages and Hijack and Ransom: Logit regressions 
Model  11a  11b  12  13  14 
Dependent:  Hostage-taking  Hijack and ransom 
Constant  5.835**     -0.965  -3.299**    -2.978*     -4.508***    
  (2.874)       (1.877)  (1.399)      (1.556)      (1.435)     
Corruption  -2.966***     -3.404***  -0.647*     -0.895**     -0.360    
  (1.041)      (1.059)  (0.364)      (0.400)      (0.358)     
Govt effectiveness  0.970     1.761*       
  (0.949)       (0.977)       
Ethnic Conf (1)  1.539**    1.613**       
  (0.715)       (0.757)       
Low Conflict      2.049***     1.523***     1.874***    
      (0.524)       (0.537)       (0.520)      
Somalia dummy      5.604***       7.320***    
      (1.934)         (1.781)      
Choke Point      1.858***     2.673***       
      0.700       (0.686)        
Deep Ports  0.242***     0.231**       
  (0.081)       (0.092)       
Petty Piracy        1.387***     1.522***    
        (0.509)       (0.513)      
Log(Kuala)  -1.589***           
  (0.207)             
Log-likelihood  -94.510  -98.410  -117.029  -117.658                      -115.939 
N  1849  1849  1728  1728  1728 
 